This paper provides a theoretical justification for regional credit facilities such as currency swap arrangements in East Asia to ward off currency attacks and deter wouldbe speculators. It also presents a case for monetary integration in East Asia. However, in view of the diverse economic, social and political background among the East Asian economies, a practical approach is to start off w ith a few small monetary unions rather than a large monetary union in the region. Lessons are drawn from a highly successful, but little known, monetary union between Brunei and Singapore.
INTRODUCTION
East Asia is at the crossroads. Their currencies and economies have just recovered from the devastation of the Asian financial crisis which began in Thailand in July 1997. The immediate and important tasks ahead for many of them are to make themselves more resilient and more able to respond quickly and effectively when financial crises strike again.
They have begun work at three levels (national, regional and international) to deal with future financial crises.
At the national level, East Asian countries, especially those badly affected by the crisis, have undertaken painful but necessary corporate restructuring and financial reforms. In addition, many have moved to a more flexible exchange rate system from a largely U.S. dollar-peg prior to the crisis.
At the regional level, the most significant move thus far is the agreement among the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to set up a pool of foreign exchange reserves that their central banks can access (through swap arrangements) when their currencies come under speculative pressures. This plan however falls short of the proposed Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) which Japan and some other Asian countries were prepared to contribute (up to U.S.$100 billion initially) to help out Asian currencies under stress. The AMF, which was proposed at the height of the Asian financial crisis, foundered on fears in Europe and the United States that it would undermine the authority of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and encourage governments to defend overvalued currencies. The ASEAN Surveillance Process was established in October 1998 to monitor and share information on movements of exchange rates and macroeconomic indicators within the ASEAN grouping in order to provide an early warning mechanism of financial turmoil. The Asian fina ncial crisis has also jolted the thinking of many Asian policy-makers, leading some to propose a common currency to make the region more resilient against currency speculations.
At the international level, there was much talk of reforming the global financial architecture. About the only concrete actions taken thus far to help countries facing a financial crisis are the introduction of the Supplementary Reserve Facility in December 1997 and the Contingent Credit Line in 1999 to strengthen the capacity of the IMF as a lender of last resort to individual countries.
To be sure, East Asian countries can, on their own accord, build strong fundamentals and adopt sound economic policies. However, there is no guarantee that these are sufficient to prevent currency attacks. Even currencies of strong economies like Hong Kong and Singapore came under selling pressures during the Asian financial crisis.
East Asian countries are at liberty to co-operate with their neighbors to strengthen their capacity to ward o ff speculative attacks. Except possibly for Japan, East Asian countries have no influence on efforts at the international level to make them less prone to currency attacks.
In fact, two developments on the global scene have made the East Asian currencie s (except the yen) particularly vulnerable to currency speculations. One is the emergence of currency blocks centered around the dollar and euro. East Asia is without any kind of regional currency union. Speculators who are no longer able to prey on currencies of the Americas and Europe can now focus their efforts on the small currencies in East Asia. The other is the large fluctuations of the exchange rates among the three major currencies (dollar, euro and yen) which have caused a great deal of misalignments for many East Asian currencies pegged closely to the U.S. dollar. The yen was trading at 200 to the U.S. dollar in mid-1980s but climbed to a high of 80 to the U.S. dollar in April 1995. It fell to about 110 during the first half of 2000. The euro was equally unstable. Introduced at about U.S.$1.17 in January 1999, the euro has since fallen to about U.S.$0.85 in October 2000, a decline of some 25 percent in less than two years.
Apart from keeping their own houses in order, East Asian countries are now more convinced than ever that they have to co-operate with each other as financial crises tend to be contagious and regional in nature.
Since currency crises create regional costs, the region has an incentive to co-operate with each other to mitigate these costs. East Asian countries have provided financial support to their neighbors affected by the financial crisis. Financial packages were also put together under the aegis of the IMF. These were, however, rather ad hoc in nature. Such a mechanism cannot possibly instill investor confidence or contain uncertainties in financial markets. What is needed is a more formal structure for the disbursement of funds to afflicted countries. An example is the swap arrangement among ASEAN members which establishes a source of fund ex ante (well before any crisis) available to countries affected by a currency crisis. Another formal structure which should be considered is a monetary (or exchange rate) union which gives a government access to a new l ine of credit from central banks of other union members because these banks are obliged to intervene to maintain the fixed exchange rates. 1 Currently, no monetary union exists among East Asian countries except the one between Brunei and Singapore. The particular monetary union between Brunei and Singapore is not well -known, at least partly it works so smoothly. As a monetary union can also act as a bulwark against currency attacks, it ought to be studied closely by East Asian countries now contemplating closer monetary cooperation. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 examines the state of Asian monetary cooperation. Section 3 presents a theoretical justification for Asian monetary cooperation. Section 4 considers the case for moving East Asia into a higher degree of monetary cooperation through monetary integration. Section 5 examines the stumbling blocks to monetary integration in East Asia. Section 6 provides the lessons that can be drawn from the experiences of Brunei and Singapore in monetary integration. Section 7 suggests a way forward for Asian monetary cooperation.
Section 8 gives the conclusions.
THE STATE OF ASIAN MONETARY COOPERATION
Asian monetary co-operation has begun long before the onset of t he Asian financial crisis. In the late 1950s, a forum called SEANZA (Southeast Asia, New Zealand, and Australia) was formed to provide training for central bankers in the region.
In 1966, ten Southeast Asian countries established SEACEN (Southeast Asia Central Banks) with a research and training centre in Kuala Lumpur.
In 1991, eleven Asian central banks established EMEAP (Executives' Meeting of East Asia Pacific Central Banks), which organizes high-level meetings and hosts working groups on financial markets, central bank operations, and prudential supervision.
EMEAP is an important instrument for enhancing Asian monetary cooperation. Out of the meetings of EMEAP evolved a web of bilateral repurchase (repo) agreements among its eleven members, under which a country may exchange U.S. dollar Treasury securities it holds for U.S. dollars from its neighbours in order to support its currency. These repo agreements enable a central bank to obtain U.S. dollar liquidity at short notice. 2 Simultaneously, the ASEAN countries have devised their own defense mechanism against currency attacks. In March 1997, the five ASEAN member countriesIndonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand -set up a currency swap arrangement, under which a central bank exchanges domestic currency for U.S. dollars, but agrees to buy back the domestic currency with U.S. dollars after a predetermined period. The swap transaction period is for up to three months, although this can be extended to a maximum of six months. Unlike the repo agreements among the EMEAP central banks which provide only short-term liquidity, the currency swap arrangement among the ASEAN members give short-term credit facilities.
Unfortunately, the amount of the ASEAN swap arrangement was only a modest U.S.$100 million (but later expanded to U.S.$200 million) which could hardly act as an effective deterrence against currency speculators.
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Asian monetary co-operation gained further momentum after the collapse of the Thai baht in July 1997. At the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) of finance ministers in Bangkok in September 1997, Japan proposed an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to prevent the recurrence of the Asian currency crisis and to institutionalize financial cooperation among the Asian nations.
Japan was willing to contribute up to one -half of its initial capital of U.S.$100 billion, with the rest of the fund reportedly coming from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore. The AMF did not take off as it was opposed by the Americ ans and Europeans, on the grounds that it could dilute the influence of the IMF and allow debtor countries to evade adjustments. 4 In 1999, Japan made another bold move by signing two large bilateral deals with its neighbors. Its agreement with South Kor ea allows each country to swap its local currency for up to U.S.$5 billion in cash from its counterpart. A similar agreement with Malaysia provides funds of up to U.S.$2.5 billion. Because Japan has a huge reserve of some U.S.$304 billion and is currently seeking a greater role in Asia, its bilateral pledges are more credible than are those among ASEAN members.
More recently, East Asian countries embarked on another arrangement for warding off speculative attacks. At the Asian Development Bank meeting in Chiang Mai in May 2000, the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian nations together with Japan, China and South Korea agreed to expand their web of bilateral currency swap agreements. The details of the new swap arrangement are yet to be worked out. The crucial issues that need to be settled include: the size of the expanded swap arrangement, a time-table for implementation, whether or not borrowings would be in the form of liquidity (as in the repo agreements among EMEAP members) or credit (as in the currency swap arrangement among ASEAN members), the conditions attached for the use of the fund, and whether the arrangement would be administered by individual central banks or by a central institution. At the same gathering, the original five ASEAN members agreed that their existing currency swap arrangement should be enlarged to include Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar. In addition, they agreed to increase the total amount of funds under their currency arrangement from U.S.$200 million to US$ 2 billion.
A THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ASIAN MONETARY COOPERATION
The Asian currency crisis shows clearly that the lack of foreign reserves can hamper a country's ability to deal with adverse shocks.
A country that has substantial international liquidity -large foreign exchange reserves and a ready access to foreign currency loan -is less likely to be the object of a currency attack. Substantial liquidity also e nables a country already under speculative pressures to defend itself better and make orderly adjustment. The challenge is to secure the liquidity at reasonable cost. Asian monetary co-operation in the form of swap arrangements is one source of dependable liquidity that Asian countries may need during times of crises. The IMF simply does not have ample resources and its funding to countries affected by the Asian currency crisis was parceled out rather slowly and with stringent fiscal and monetary conditions.
Consider the following small model to see the usefulness of the liquidity provided by a swap arrangement:
where b' > 0; and W = W(E, F), W1 > 0 and W2 > 0 Equation (1) is an uncovered interest parity augmented by the domestic bond market equilibrium, where i (i*) is the domestic (foreign) interest rate, π(E 1 -E)/E is the expected depreciation of the domestic currency, E is the exchange rate (local currency per unit of foreign currency), E1 is the equilibrium exchange rate and π is the probability of devaluation. The term (B/W) describes the worldwide relative private holdings of domestic bonds, where B is the stock of domestic currency government bonds held by the private sector at home and abroad, and W is the domestic currency value of world wealth in the private sector. An increase in the relative supply of domestic bonds requires an increase in the expected relative rate of return (or risk premium) for these assets to be willingly held in international portfolios. In other words, the demand for domestic bonds, from at home and abroad, varies positively (b' > 0) with the difference between the domestic interest rate and the foreign interest rate, adjusted for the expected rate of depreciation, as well as the worldwide private wealth in terms of domestic currency.
The wealth W consists of domestic bonds, foreign bonds, domestic money and foreign money. It varies with the exchange rate, E, and foreign currency loans, F. A devaluation of the domestic currency, by raising the domestic value of foreign assets, will increase the domestic currency value of wealth. An increase in F will result in an increase in W if the domestic government uses the foreign currency holdings obtained through a swap arrangement to purchase securities issued by the private sector. 6 But if the foreign currency holdings are simply exchanged for government bonds in the private sector, there will be no wealth effect but merely a change in the composition of wealth in the private sector.
Let π be the perceived probability that the government cannot support the current exchange rate. Conversely, (1 -π) is the perceived commitment or the credibility of the government to defend the current exchange rate. π is assumed to be an exogenous parameter in the present model and takes on the following values:
(2) π = 1 when i > ic π = π* where 1 > π* > 0 when i < ic We first assume that there is an interest rate ceiling, i c , beyond which the domestic economy cannot bear.
If the domestic interest rate is greater than i c , the authorities will have to give up defending the exchange rate and allow the domestic currency to devalue.
Suppose that the current account and the asset markets are initially in equilibrium. Now consider the case where there is a random shock such as the regional economic crisis which pushes up the equilibrium exchange rate E 1. From equation (1), the shock causes the domestic interest rate to rise if the authorities attempt to prevent the domestic currency from depreciating. Both foreign reserves and money supply in the domestic country will fall. As long as the higher domestic interest rate is still below the interest rate ceiling (ic), there will be no currency crisis. But suppose that the shock from the regional economic crisis, perhaps compounded by speculative attacks on the domestic currency, is so large that the domestic interest rate shoots above the interest rate ceiling. 7 In this situation, π is equal to unity. The possibility of π equals to unity is therefore self-fulfilling since the government will have to give up defending the exchange rate at a cost much less than the cost of high domestic interest rate. Once the current exchange rate regime collapses, domestic interest rate will fall back to i* + b (.) and the exchange rate will depreciate to E1
To prevent a currency crisis from happening, the country must ensure that the domestic interest rate stays below the interest r ate ceiling after a shock. If shock is accompanied by a speculative attack on the domestic currency, the government will have to buy the local currency with foreign exchange reserves if it wants to maintain the exchange rate. In this situation, both foreign reserves and money supply will fall. One way of curbing the rise in the domestic interest rate and sterilizing any loss of foreign reserves is for the authorities to buy domestic government bonds from the private sector with base money.
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This is an open market operation which affects only the composition of wealth, but not the total wealth, in the private sector. In this case, the government is acting as a lender of last resort. It can be seen from equation (1) that a reduction in B leads to a fall in the domestic interest rate. As the country is losing foreign exchange reserves, an open market operation can provide only a temporary relief.
A more effective approach is to use the foreign currency loans to bring down the domestic interest r ate. From equation (1), an increase in the private sector's wealth leads to an increase in the demand for domestic bonds, which can have the effect of keeping the domestic interest rate below the critical level. To increase the wealth in the private sector, the domestic government must use the foreign currency loans to purchase securities issued by the private sector. For example, during the height of the Asian financial crisis in August 1998, the Hong Kong authorities bought the local currency to maintain the currency peg to the U.S. dollar but put the money back into the economy by buying local equities to prevent the domestic interest rate from rising.
A bolder approach is to energetically force an appreciation of the domestic currency in the mids t of exchange rate pressures in order to "punish" speculators. The domestic central bank can achieve this by buying enough of the domestic money with its foreign reserves. However, an appreciation in itself is self-defeating because it only increases the domestic interest rate with further loss of foreign reserves. To prevent a rise of the domestic interest rate amidst an appreciation of the domestic currency, it is necessary to augment the foreign currency holdings of the domestic government through foreign currency loans. Using the foreign currency holdings to buy assets issued by the private sector, the country is thus able to appreciate the domestic currency and control the domestic interest rate simultaneously. As shown in Chan and Ngiam (1998) , w hen the Singapore dollar was under speculative attack in September 1985, the Singapore authorities engineered an appreciation of the Singapore dollar to stem currency speculations and claimed to have inflicted punishment on speculators. Singapore did not take any foreign currency loans or use its excess reserves (defined as the excess of foreign exchange reserves over and above the monetary base) to bring down the domestic interest rate. As a result, the tight liquidity caused the overnight interest rate t o jump to 105 percent on 17 September 1985. 9 Fortunately, Singapore was able to inflict heavy losses on currency speculators. It remains to be seen whether this policy of appreciation to beat down currency speculators without simultaneously containing the rise in the domestic interest rate can be repeated in the future.
On its face value, appreciating the exchange rate to stem out currency attacks seems nonsensical. However, there is one important aspect of this policy which has been widely ignored: It can in fact help the authority to re-establish its reputation as a tough, committed government. The economic impact of a rise in credibility can be illustrated by a lower value of the parameter π*. From an inspection of equation (1), if the impact of an appreciation on π* is sufficiently large, offsetting the direct impacts of the appreciation itself, interest rate need not be raised and, perhaps, could even be lowered. If the threat of retaliatory appreciation is fully anticipated by speculators, π* could be lowered without the need of an actual appreciation. In other words, the domestic interest rates could be lowered without actual adjustments in the exchange rates. The threat could work as long as it is credible and there is a chance that it will be applied. Speculators do not attack a currency at random; they will attack only when a country's credibility in defending its currency is in doubt. Credibility should be a function of the amount of foreign reserves and foreign currency loans committed to defend the exchange rate.
THE CASE FOR MOVING TOWARDS MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA
While a case can be made for Asian monetary cooperation in the form of swap arrangements, it is however a highly debatable issue when it comes to the question of whether East Asian countries should move in the direction of monetary integration. Before delving into this issue, it should be noted that there are various degrees of monetary integration. The most basic form of monetary integration is a monetary (or exchange-rate) union, whereby countries join together in an attempt to irrevocably fix their exchange rates and follow a common monetary policy. 10 Examples of a monetary union include the monetary union between Brunei and Singapore, and the irrevocable fixed exchange rates in the third stage of the European Monetary Union (EMU) starting on 1 January 1999. The most advance form of monetary integration is called a currency union, which can be defined as an area with a single currency and a common central bank.
The EMU will become a currency union in 2002 when the euro, under the control of the European Central Bank, will be the sole currency in circulation in Euroland.
Before the Asian currency crisis, the Thai baht, Malaysian ringgit and Indonesian rupiah were on a quasi-U.S. dollar peg. Many observers have attributed the crisis to the quasi-U.S. dollar peg by these countries. Since the outbreak of the crisis, most of the East Asian economies have managed their exchange rates more flexibly and have assigned greater weight to the yen at the expense of the U.S. dollar in their currency baskets.
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The crisis, which has devastated not only the financial markets but also the real sectors of many East Asian economies, has been the single greatest catalyst for the fast pace of monetary co-operation in East Asia. Although the idea of a common currency for East Asia may seem too far-fetched at the moment, one can nonetheless think of many justifications for some form of monetary integration in East Asia, s ome of which are discussed below.
a. A More Credible Exchange Rate System
After paying a hefty price for their quasi-peg to the U.S. dollar, why should East Asian countries want to peg their currencies with each other or form a monetary union among themselves? The answer, it seems, lies with a popular view that with high capital mobility, only the two extremes -free float or rigidly fixed rate -are tenable, but that intermediate regimes like pegs and target zones are not. However, floating rates occasionally exhibit high volatility. This is a serious problem especially for small open economies in East Asia with illiquid foreign exchange markets.
Moreover, the monetary autonomy that a country enjoys under a floating system gives rise to the issue of time consistency of optimal policy.
To the extent that the policy rule is not time consistent, it will lack credibility. By contrast, a country can attain credibility by joining a monetary union.
To illustrate the credibility issue under a monetary union, consider the money market equilibrium conditions in Brunei (B) and Singapore (S):
where P is the price level, L is the money demand function, Y is the real income, and M is the money supply. Assume that capital is freely mobile between the two countries and that their financial assets are perfectly substitutable, we have the following interest rate parity condition:
where e is the expected depreciation of country B's currency (appreciation of country S's currency). Under monetary integration, e = 0, so that
Assuming that the prices and real incomes are given, we still have an undetermined system of three equations [(3), (4) and (6)] and four unknowns (the two money supplies and the two interest rates).
The undetermined system problem can be solved by the two countries agreeing on how monetary or exchange rate policy should be conducted. There are basically three kinds of arrangements.
First, the two countries can jointly determine the level of money supply in the union. Once the level of money supply is chosen, the interest rates in the union will be determined. The two currencies will jointly float agai nst all other currencies. Second, both countries can agree to peg their currencies to a third-country's currency (or a fixed basket of currencies of third countries) which will indirectly peg the exchange rate of the two currencies. 12 In such an arrangement, the money stocks of the two countries will be pinned down by the third country's money stock. Third, one country (say country S) can play the dominant role and set its own money supply or exchange rate. This course of action will determine i S in equation (4), which will determine M B in equation (3). The first two arrangements are symmetric systems in which members cooperate in reaching a policy solution. The third arrangement is an asymmetric system in which one country assumes the leadership role.
There are two reasons why a monetary union should be more credible than the unilateral quasi-peg to the U.S. dollar adopted by several East Asian countries before the Asian currency crisis. First, members in a union are "obliged" to help each other to defend the fixed exchange rate among themselves. In particular, when a speculative crisis arose, requiring intervention in the foreign exchange market, a member with a strong (weak) currency would be required to expand (contract) its monetary policies.
Second, a country with poor monetary policy credibility could reduce its inflation rate by joining a union with a low inflation country. A union could thus be regarded as a commitment to tie the hands and thereby gain credibility. For example, Italy could benefit in two ways by joining a monetary union with Germany: one from intervention by Germany to defend the agreed parities and the other from the anti-inflation credibility that Germany had already acquired. Unfortunately, Germany did not live up to the expectations during the European exchange market crisis of 1992-93.
As Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) point out: 'Germany's Bundesbank, backed by the German government, has interpreted its obligations to extend only to interventions that, in its view, do not threaten its prime objective of low domestic inflation.' 13
b. Strengthening the Defense Mechanism Against Currency Attacks
To show how a monetary union can help strengthen the defense mechanism against currency attacks, it is useful to return to the two-country money market model. When speculators start selling country S's currency, they buy either country B's currency or a third country's currency. If they purchase country B's currency, there will be no limit to the size of the intervention by country's S central bank as long as country B's central bank is willing to supply its currency to country S's central bank. However, if speculators buy a third country's currency, country B can help only in a limited way by lending its foreign exchange reserves to Country S. In fact, a monetary union makes it easier for members to help out each other during a currency crisis because of the transparency and economic discipline required to operate a fixed exchange rate system. The current repo and swap arrangements among Asian countries are prone to the problem of "moral hazard" as countries might be tempted to engage in dangerous practices in the expectation of larger bailouts with looser condition. To reduce such a problem, the arrangements must come with conditions attached obliging the participants to follow sound and disciplined economic policies.
c. Increasing Regional Trade and Investment
The East Asian region is unique as the countries are at different and extreme stages of development.
To exploit their comparative advantage, local firms and multinational corporations (MNCs) have to diversify their production processes and stages of production across various countries in the region. Good examples of this are the electronics industries operating in the ASEAN countries and the other industries in the so-called "Growth Triangles".
14 With more stable exchange rates among currencies in the region through a monetary union, MNCs operating in the region will not be subject to exchange rate risks for their intra-regional transactions. As a result, the region should become more attractive to foreign investors. Currently, trade among the East Asian economies accounts for only 34.5 percent of their total global trade (See Table 1 ). With greater stability of their exchange rates, intra-Asian trade should also grow. There is now a greater urgency for greater economic integration within Asia as more regional trading blocks (such as NAFTA, the EU and the Mercosur) have been set up and as the exchange rates among the major currencies are highly volatile. Asian countries may have no choice but to boost their intra-regional trade and to insulate themselves from financial disturbances originating outside the region. In theory, Asian countries can achieve greater economic integration through regional free trade arrangements such as ASEAN and the impending bilateral trade agreements like the one currently being negotiated between Japan and Singapore. 15 In practice, however, trade liberalization often requires stable exchange rates. Otherwise, enterprises in the stable currency countries may demand compensatory tariffs on products from countries which devalue significantly. Unstable exchange rates could thus undermine the regional free trade arrangements.
In the inter-war years, the collapse of trading blocs was accompanied by the collapse of currency relations, and states resorted to either exchange rate manipulation and/or tariff protection (see Simmons, 1994) . Monetary union is one way to avoid a repetition of these experiences.
d. Avoiding Competitive Devaluation
When the currency of an East Asian economy devalues, its neighbours may react against a revaluation of their currencies by countering with their own currency devaluation. During the Asian financial crisis, there was no speculative attacks against the Singapore dollar. But Singapore has allowed its currency to fall against the US dollar in line with the regional currencies in order to preserve its competitiveness. 16 With most East Asian currencies tumbling against the U.S. dollar during the Asian financial crisis, China might also be tempted to devalue the yuan to restore the loss of competitiveness against its competitors, particularly the Southeast Asian economies. Amidst the currency turmoil in East Asia, the yuan remained steady against the U.S. dollar throughout 1997 and 1998. According to Kwan (1998) , a devalua tion of the yuan during the Asian financial crisis could set off another round of currency devaluation in Asia. Such a threat of competitive devaluation can be avoided if East Asian economies move towards greater monetary integration. McKinnon (1998) claims that the informal dollar peg (or a pseudo-exchange-rate union) adopted by the East Asia's developing economies before the Asian currency crisis has insulated each other from beggar-thyneighbour devaluations.
STUMBLING BLOCKS TO ASIAN MONETARY INTEGRATION
Before East Asian countries can agree on monetary integration, they have to overcome many stumbling blocks. First, the costs associated with relinquishing an independent exchange rate policy may be unacceptably high for some countries. Second, even if the costs are not too onerous, they may be unable to agree on a common monetary (or exchange rate) policy. Third, strong political will may not yet exist for them to consider forming a Pan-Asian monetary integration.
a. Costs
The costs of sacrificing the monetary (or exchange rate) control would be higher if the East Asian region is characterized by asymmetric shocks, lack of labour mobility, and nominal wage and price inflexibility. The theory of the optimal currency area (OCA) suggests that the costs of joining a monetary union will be high if union members have asymmetric output shocks (Mundell, 1961) . The reasoning is that when faced with the occurrence of asymmetric shocks, union members adversely affected would be unable to alter their exchange rates to stabilize their output. However, the costs would be minimized if labour is mobile within the region or if there is wage and price flexibility in East Asia.
Using the structural vector autoregressive (VAR) methodology of Blanchard and Quah (1989) , Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) analyze the correlation of supply and demand shocks in East Asia. A high (low) correlation in supply shocks among a group of countries means that these are subject to symmetric (asymmetric) shocks and are thus good (poor) candidates for a monetary union. 17 They compare the results for East Asia with that for Europe and the Americas. Interestingly, they find that "conditions are more conducive to monetary unification in East Asia than in the Americas". 18 Another strong support for Asian monetary integration is provided by Loayza, Lopez, and Ubide (1999) who present evidence from an error components model on the importance of country-specific, sector -specific, and common shocks for countries in East A sia, Latin America and Europe. They find significant short -run and long-run comovements of shocks within East Asia, comparable to those found within Europe. In particular, about half of the short-run fluctuations in East Asia come from common shocks. In contrast, the variability of output growth in Latin America is largely explained by country-specific components. They interpret their results as evidence of high degree of symmetric shocks in the East Asian region and that the Asian countries are good candidates for the establishment of a monetary union.
Expanding on the work of Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) , Chow and Kim (2000) reach a different conclusion. They find that regional shocks, which capture symmetric shocks, are dominant in Euroland. In contrast, country-specific (or asymmetric) shocks are prevalent in European countries outside Euroland and in East Asia. 19 The implication is that a monetary integration may be sustainable for Euroland but not for East Asia. Their finding for East Asia seems to be more intuitive than previous studies, given the diversity of the East Asian economies in terms of economic structures, policy objectives, and levels of economic development (See Table 2 ). Even with asymmetric shocks, the costs of sacrificing the use of exchange rate changes would be minimal if there is factor mobility or flexibility of the labour markets within the region. 20 With labour mobility, labour can always move out of those countries adversely affected by asymmetric shocks. Alternatively, if these countries have flexible labour markets, their real wages would adjust to restore the internal and external balance. The crucial question is whether these two conditions exist in East Asia.
According to Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1999) , the speed of adjustment to shocks in East Asia is higher than that in Europe, suggesting that "labour markets are more flexible in East Asia than in Western Europe". 21 It is a well-known fact that many of the successful economies in East Asia such as Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei have been hosts to a large pool of foreign workers from all over Asia. Abella (1998) reveals that in 1998 there were some 5 million foreign workers in seven East Asian economies: Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea ( Table 3 ). The estimate for Singapore, and probably for other countries as well, is on the low side. Whereas the study indicates that there were 450,000 foreign workers in Singapore in 1998, the official statistics show a figure of some 700,000 for the same year. 22 Tallying the 700,000 foreign workers in the country with a local workforce of close to two million, this means that one out of every four workers in Singapore is non-Singaporean. The study also notes that in recent years, the fastest growth is observed in the flows to Malaysia (from Indonesia, Bangladesh, the Philippines, and Thailand); to Thailand (from Burma and Indo-China); to Taiwan (from Thailand, the Philippines, and China); to Korea (from China, the Philippines, Nepal, and Bangladesh); and to Singapore (from Hong Kong, China, Indonesia and Sri Lanka). Note: n.a. = not available; * = mostly Burmese; ** = mostly Koreans Source: Abella (1998) It is much harder to ascertain the degree of price and wage flexibility in East Asia. One way of assessing the flexibility of the labour markets is to examine the minimum wage policy and the unemployment rate in each country. As can be seen in Table 4 , all the countries in Euroland except Ireland have some kind of minimum wage policy. In contrast, only a few countries in East Asia (notably Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and the Philippines) have minimum wage policies or strong labour unions, suggesting that wages can be easily adjusted in East Asia to clear the labour market. 23 The flexible labour market in East Asia is also reflected in its lower unemployment rate as compared to that in Euroland. Note: * = % of total labour force ** = country has sectoral minimum wage but no minimum wage policy Source: 1999 World Development Indicators.
b. Common Exchange Rate Policy
Even if the East Asian economies decide to form a monetary (or exchange rate) union after considering that the benefits outweigh the costs associated with relinquishing an independent exchange rate policy, they still have to agree on a common monetary (or exchange rate) policy.
There are several approaches to a common exchange rate policy. One is to jointly peg their currencies to a single currency or to a common basket o f currencies. Alternatively, they can decide on a joint managed float or a joint free float. Table 5 , the East Asian region is characterized by the diversity of its exchange rate arrangements. The foreign exchange regimes in East Asia range from a hard peg (Hong Kong and Brunei) to an independent float (Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines and Thailand). While many East Asian economies have perfect capital mobility (such as Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore), others (notably China and Malaysia) still have some forms of capital controls. Such a wide range of exchange rate regimes makes it extremely difficult for them to agree on a common exchange rate policy. 
As shown in

c. Political Will
Even if the economic logic is not in doubt, the next major question is whether East Asian economies have the political will to form a monetary union among themselves.
To be sure, the Asian financial crisis has somewhat changed the mindset of Asian p olicy-makers, leading some to even propose a common currency to make the region more resilient against currency attacks.
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In December 1998, the ASEAN heads of state issued the Hanoi plan of action which directed the ASEAN secretariat to study the feasibility of an ASEAN currency. With the quick recovery from the Asian financial crisis, interest in a common currency for East Asia has begun to wane. A common currency for East Asia, or even for ASEAN alone, is unlikely to be a reality in the foreseeable future as it would require an enormous degree of political commitment and a paradigm shift from nationalism to regionalism. East Asia is far from united as there is still a great deal of rivalries and suspicions among the major Asian powers such as between China and Japan and between Korea and Japan. Moreover, unlike Europe, there is no pan-Asian institution, except for ASEAN, which could kick-start the process of Asian monetary integration.
The East Asian economies have to chart their own course as there is no history of monetary integration in East Asia except the one between Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore (from 1967 to 1973) and the one between Brunei and Singapore (from 1973 till today). The experience of the European Monetary System (EMS) is instructive and widely admired in East Asia. But the East Asian region might not be able to replicate much of the European experience as it contains vast differences in political systems, exchange rate regimes and economic disparities. Given the different levels of economic development in East Asia, it would take several decades for them to fulfill the 'convergence criteria' as in the case of the EMS. It should be noted that it took Europe some fifty years to meet the conditions for fixing their exchange rates i mmutably in Euroland.
LESSONS FROM THE CURRENCY UNION BETWEEN BRUNEI AND SINGAPORE
Brunei and Singapore have a long history of monetary integration.
In June 1967, Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore adopted a system of free interchangeability of their respective currencies, in order to maintain strong economic and trade ties. This tripartite arrangement allowed for the Brunei, Malaysian and Singapore dollars to be used in the three countries. Under this system, each country issued it ow n currency that was legal tender domestically but "customary tender" in the other two countries. The banks in each country were obliged to accept, at par and without charge, the notes and coins of the other countries. In other words, the exchange rates of the three currencies were fixed one -to-one -to-one. The respective currency boards of the three countries, in turn, accepted the currencies of the other countries from banks and exchange it at par without charge for its own currency. In addition, they agreed to repatriate the currencies of the other countries and to receive at par the equivalent in sterling or some other agreed currency. 25 The expenses for repatriation are borne by the currency board which issued the currency.
In May 1973, Malaysia terminated the arrangement with Singapore. Brunei decided to continue with the arrangement with Singapore and to terminate the arrangement with Malaysia.
The monetary union between Brunei and Singapore (MUBS) allows the Brunei dollar and the Singapore dollar to be customary tender in each other's territory. It also allows the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) to conduct an active exchange rate policy on behalf of both countries by managing the Singapore dollar against an undisclosed basket of currencies.
Brunei operates a currency board system by fixing its exchange rate one-to-one to the Singapore dollar and by providing 100 percent backing of its currency in circulation.
The MUBS is a dual-currency system in which the national currencies of Brunei and Singapore are circulated in the two countries. 26 Although the MUBS links the two currencies to each other one-to-one, it is not a currency union as there is no common currency like the euro. Nevertheless, it is a more co-operative and binding arrangement than a pegged system such as that between the Hong Kong dollar and the US dollar and that between the Macau pataca and the Hong dollar.
27 Under the MUBS, Brunei and Singapore are more inclined to help each other out in times of financial stress than would be the case if Brunei were to unilaterally fix its exchange rate to the Singapore dollar. 28 The arrangement has both benefits and costs.
Benefits
One significant benefit of the MUBS is that it has made the Brunei and Singapore dollars more stable (against all the other currencies) than would otherwise be. This is partly because Singapore (or Brunei) can have access to the foreign reserves of the other country. As demonstrated in Section 3 above, a country that has substantial international liquidity through a ready source of foreign currency funds is less likely to be the object of a currency attack as its credibility in defending the exchange rate is enhanced. Substantial liquidity also enables a country facing a speculative attack to defend itself better and make more orderly financial adjustments.
As the Asian financial crisis has demonstrated, liquidity is the key to deter and ward off currency speculators.
Strange to say, this kind of benefit has seldom been mentioned in the literature on monetary integration.
Although the MUBS does not specify that both countries will support each other in times of crises, it allows them to indirectly support each other's currency. Suppose that the Singapore dollar is under speculative pressures and Singapore needs additional international reserves to defend the exchange rate. It has two ways of obtaining Brunei's international reserves. One is simply to borrow Brunei's international reserves without any collateral. Brunei has the incentive to lend as the collapse of the Singapore dollar will drag down the Brunei dollar as well. The other is to exchange Singapore dollars for Brunei dollars under the agreement and sell the Brunei dollar for international reserves.
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This is tantamount to a collateralized credit (or a swap) facilities in which the Singapore authorities swap Singapore dollars for international reserves. Singapore's success in warding off speculative attacks of its currency in September 1985 and in avoiding the worst effects of the Asian financial crisis could be due partly to the combined financial strength of two countries rather than its own reserves.
Other benefits of the MUBS include the gains in economic efficiency as a result of (a) the elimination of transaction costs associated with the exchanging of the two currencies and (b) the reduction of risk arising from the uncertain future movements of the bilateral exchange rate.
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The efficiency gain should be reflected in the size and growth of trade and investment flows between the two countries. Table 6 shows Brunei's exports and imports by destination. It can be seen that the MUBS has helped Singapore to retain its position as the largest supplier of goods to Brunei, accounting for some 25.6 percent of Brunei's total imports in 1 997. Brunei's total exports have not been growing because it relies almost exclusively on the exports of oil and gas which have suffered from declining prices since the early 1980s. It sells its oil and gas mainly to Japan. The MUBS has not resulted in a greater flow of Brunei's oil and gas to Singapore because these two commodities are traded in the U.S. dollar. The growth of capital flows between the two countries can only be partially deduced from the increase in the repatriation of the two currencies. Figure 1 shows that the amount of Singapore dollar repatriated from Brunei to Singapore has all along been small. In 1999, it stood at only S$5 million. In contrast, the amount of Brunei currency repatriated from Singapore to Brunei has risen steadily from a low of B$29.93 million to a record high of B$852.7 million in 1999. These figures do not include a probably much larger capital flows undertaken t hrough the banking system by way of book entries. This is confirmed by the Brunei Currency Board that "each year commercial banks are able to move billions of dollars between the two countries without running the risk of currency rate fluctuations". 31 The fact that Brunei uses the financial services of Singapore more than other regional financial centres like Hong Kong is an indication of the benefits derived from the currency arrangement.
Brunei has gained by linking itself with Singapore which has the credibility of maintaining a conservative monetary policy and a low inflation rate. Thus, the MUBS may be viewed as a way for Brunei to borrow Singapore's credibility in the same way that France and Italy have borrowed German credibility under the European Monetary system. This is evident from Table 7 which shows that the average annual inflation rates in Singapore and Brunei were fairly low during the period 1967-97, averaging 3.81 and 3.07 percent respectively. Although the inflation rate in Brunei was higher than that in Singapore, it had over the years converged to the level in Singapore, falling from 4.2 percent in the sub-period 1977-87 to 2.4 percent in the sub-period 1987-97. 33 Their inflation rates were highly correlated with a coefficient of 0.68 and was significant at the 5 percent level. It can be seen that two of their important neighbors, Malaysia and Thailand, had higher inflation rates. While Brunei's inflation rate was correlated with that of these two neighbors, Singapore's inflation rate was not.
However, the statistics for output growth tell a different story. Brunei's real GDP growth in Brunei was a modest 1.7 percent during the period 1967-1997. In contrast, Singapore's real GDP growth during the same period was a robust 8.3 percent. As expected, their output growth had a zero correlation. Even though Malaysia was not a member of the MUBS, its growth rate was highly correlated with that of Singapore. This evidence suggests that one should not expect the GDP growth of union members to converge as output growth has little to do with the currency arrangement. Economic growth implies mostly improvements in the terms of trade, accumulation of factors of production, productivity increase and innovation. 
Costs
The major cost of the MUBS is that in order to maintain the par rate, one or both of the countries may lose monetary autonomy. As Singapore pursues an independent exchange rate policy, it has nothing to lose from the arrangement barring s erious instability in Brunei. The cost to Brunei, in terms of relinquishing its right to adjust the exchange rate in the face of economic shocks, is less obvious. It will be low if the two countries have symmetric supply shocks. This is because symmetric shocks between Brunei and Singapore reduce the need for altering relative prices between them. However, if the two countries have asymmetric shocks, then separate exchange rate and monetary policies could help stabilize national-specific (or idiosyncratic) fluctuations in economic activity. 34 Whether shocks between the two countries are symmetrical or not, depend partly on (a) the similarity of their production and trade structure, and (b) the degree of their economic integration. When their production and trade structure is different, they are more likely to face asymmetric disturbances as specific shocks are likely to affect them differently (Kenen, 1969) .
The relation between economic integration and the occurrence of symmetric shocks is debatable. According to the EC Commission (1990), economic integration should lead to symmetric shocks as it encourages intra-industry trade in which countries buy and sell to each other the same category of products. This kind of trade structure leads to a situation where demand shocks will affect these countries in a similar way. Frankel and Rose (1996) reach the same conclusion but argues instead that symmetric shocks come from the marginal propensities to import from each other as well as productivity shocks spilling over through trade. Other authors (Eichengreen, 1990; Krugman, 1991) hold the opposite view. They argue that as economic integration becomes more highly integrated, countries specialize more in production. Greater specialization will lead to occur rence of asymmetric shocks in the countries.
Although Brunei and Singapore decided to form a monetary union, it is noteworthy that their economic structures have remained vastly different. Oil and gas continue to dominate t he Brunei economy as the export share of these two items constitutes over 90 percent of its total exports. Singapore, on the other hand, has a more diversified and advanced production structure. In addition, it has a world-class business and financial services sector. As their economic structures are dissimilar, there is a prima facie evidence that they have asymmetric shocks.
To verify whether their shocks are indeed asymmetrical, we estimate the correlation between movements in real GDP that can be t hought of as being driven by fluctuations in aggregate demand (AD), and movements that are due to fluctuations in aggregate supply (AS). The Blanchard and Quah (1989) procedure is employed to decompose fluctuations in GDP into these two components.
Underlying the procedure is an AD-AS model which assumes that supply disturbances affect long run output and prices, while demand disturbances only affect long run prices.
The procedure involves estimating a bivariate VAR model consisting of inflation and r eal GDP of Brunei and Singapore (Malaysia and Thailand are included in our estimation in order to provide a benchmark). Whether a group of countries should form a monetary union among themselves depends on how synchronized are their supply shocks rather t han how synchronized are their GDP movements. For example, it is possible for Brunei and Singapore to have negatively correlated demand shocks but positively correlated supply shocks. In this case, their GDP movements are likely to be uncorrelated, but t he positive correlation between their supply shocks makes them good candidates for a monetary union. Table 8 reveals that both supply and demand shocks between Brunei and Singapore are not correlated. It would appear that the pattern of structural shocks does not identify these two countries as particularly well-suited for a monetary union. Our findings do not support the argument by Frankel and Rose (1996) that the fulfillment of the criteria of an OCA is endogenous since MUBS has not forced the de mand shocks of Brunei and Singapore (and hence their output growth) to be positively correlated.
In contrast, supply shocks were highly correlated between Malaysia and Singapore, while demand shocks were highly correlated for Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. On this score alone, Malaysia was probably a better candidate than Brunei for forming a monetary union with Singapore. We also test whether the business cycles among Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore had become more synchronized over the years. By splitting the sample period into two sub-periods (1975-1985 and 1986-1996) , we find that the GDP growth among Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore were more correlated in the second sub-period than in the first. This could be due to the assimilation of their industrial and trade structures.
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As Brunei and Singapore experienced asymmetric shocks, the cost to Brunei of forming a monetary union with Singapore would, on the surface, appear to be high. However, the actual cost to Brunei is likely to be minimal as unemployment is not usually a concern to Brunei as it has a large pool of foreign workers. Unemployment can be easily eliminated through adjustment in the number of foreign workers who may be allowed to work in Brunei. In any case, the fact tha t the MUBS has lasted for so long without any complaint by Brunei may indicate that the benefits outweigh the cost. In fact, Brunei's Ministry of Finance provided a favorable assessment of the MUBS by stating that "the Monetary Authority of Singapore exe rcises sufficient caution and such a link will not have detrimental effect on the economies of either. At the same time, this agreement is not seen as inhibiting the management of the domestic economy".
36 Table 8 Correlations of Shocks Between Brunei and Singapore Supply Shocks
Demand Shocks
Note: * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level.
A WAY FORWARD
The idea of a large monetary union in East A sia may be conceptually appealing, but would be difficult to achieve in practical terms. The experience of the 15 members of the European Union is instructive. This group has participated in the EMS to limit exchange rate fluctuations among themselves and to establish coordinated macroeconomic polices across Western Europe. The EMS has gone through a number of changes since its inception in 1979, including major currency crises in 1992 and 1993, and conversion of 11 members to the euro on January 1, 1999. Perhaps the most important lesson to be learnt from the EMS is that a large monetary union with huge divergence of economic variables among members makes it susceptible to speculative attacks and put into question its sustainability. As East Asia has a much greater divergence of economic indicators than Western Europe, it should proceed with extreme caution in moving towards a monetary integration. A gradualist rather than a "big bang" approach should enhance the sustainability of monetary cooperation efforts in East Asia.
If an Asian-wide monetary union is not practical at the present time, the pertinent question is how Asian monetary cooperation should proceed.
We propose a two-track approach. On the broader front, East Asia countries should c ontinue with their efforts to enlarge and strengthen their pool of credit facilities such as the currency swap arrangements and the proposed AMF.
But credit facilities without any conditionality often raise the problem of "moral hazard" as countries might be tempted to engage in dangerous practices in the expectation that they will be bailed out. On the sub-regional front, small groups of more or less homogeneous countries may form monetary unions (or "clusters") of their own. East Asia could easily accommodate a few small clusters. The size of each cluster can be enlarged when a sufficient degree of harmonization and convergence has been attained. Each cluster (like the one involving Brunei and Singapore) will fix the exchange rates among themselves and decide on their own common exchange rate policy. Initially, the focus should be on harmonization within each cluster. Integration between small functioning monetary unions can be subsequently considered. Once a high degree of harmonization and convergence across various monetary unions is achieved, East Asia can then consider creating an East Asian currency.
There is a strong case for using the proposed AMF to support the sustainability of the clusters. This is because monetary unions reduce the risk of moral hazards inherent in the AMF since members can exert the necessary discipline on the other members' macroeconomic policies.
If clustering of monetary unions should be the first step in a journey of a thousand miles, then the logical question is how to determine the various clusters. One can use the correlations of supply shocks to identify the potential clusters of monetary unions in East Asia.
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This has been attempted by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) using the procedure of Blanchard and Quah (1989) , which was discussed in the previous section. We have updated their work by using data up to 1997 and incorporated countries (such as China, Macau and Brunei) which their study has left out. As a result, we have come out with some fascinating and intuitive results.
Our findings on the correlations of supply shocks among the East Asian countries are presented in Table 9 . 38 The results suggest that the supply disturbances were correlated for eight small clusters of countries: (1) Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, (2) Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, (3) Singapore and Malaysia, (4) Malaysia and Indonesia, (5) Thailand and Japan, (6) Thailand and Australia, (7) South Korea and Brunei, and (8) Macau and Taiwan. Interestingly, the inclusion of China in our study does not show that it belongs to the cluster comprising Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
In contrast, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) find that the supply disturbances were correlated for only three clusters of countries: (1) Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, (2) Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, and (3) Taiwan and Thailand. Similar to our findings, their study also suggests that the supply shocks of Australia were not correlated with New Zealand or with any of the othe r East Asian countries.
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Insert Table 9   Table 9 Correlations of Supply Shocks in East Asia Our results are suggestive rather than conclusive. This is because the symmetry of shocks is only one of the conditions for assessing whether a group of countries should form a monetary union among themselves. Even if a group of countries were confronted with symmetric shocks, they could still face different adjustment costs due to structural differences.
Examining the variance decompositions (VA) offers a good way to understand the underlying structural differences among the economies. Table  10 gives the decomposition of the percentage change in real output at one and four year forecasting horizons that can be explained by supply shocks and nominal shocks. The table reveals that supply shocks explain the preponderance of the changes in real output in all the economies in East Asia except South Korea and Malaysia. Nominal shocks seem to be dominant in explaining output variability for South Korea and Malaysia.
Although Singapore and Malaysia displa y symmetry in supply shocks, there are structural differences between the two countries. Japan and South Korea also face a similar situation. Structural differences between Singapore and Malaysia and between Japan and South Korea can be an impediment to the formation of monetary union by these two groups of countries. On the basis of symmetry in macroeconomic disturbances, geographic proximity and socio-cultural compatibility, our results suggest at least three clusters of countries as plausible candidates for monetary integration: (1) Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia, (2) Japan and Korea, and (3) Taiwan and Hong Kong. These three clusters represent the Southeast Asian bloc, the Northeast Asian bloc, and the Greater C hina bloc respectively.
Grouping Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia as one bloc, and Japan and South Korea as another, is not totally surprising as there is a great deal of trade within these two blocs. Even though Hong Kong trades substantially with China and has exhibited a positive growth correlation with the Mainland, both of these Chinese (but very different) economies have displayed asymmetric bilateral shocks. In fact, China has experienced mainly idiosyncratic shocks and its supply shocks are not c orrelated with any of the other East Asian economies. Hence, on the basis of the symmetry of supply shocks, a cluster consisting of Taiwan and Hong Kong seems to make economic sense but is obviously not a politically plausible option at the present moment.
In the final analysis, political factors play a crucial role in determining the process towards monetary integration. An extensive exposition of the political issues in monetary integration is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is recognized that at the present moment the political will for monetary integration in East Asia is practically non-existent.
CONCLUSIONS
The Asian financial crisis has demonstrated that currency crises tend to be regional, with even currencies of strong economies falling prey to regional contagion. Since currency crises impose regional costs, East Asian countries have an incentive to work together to make themselves less vulnerable against future currency attacks. Towards this end, they have banded together to protect each other by embarking on several initiatives. First, they have widened and deepened their network of bilateral currency swap arrangements. Second, they are taking another hard look at the creation of an AMF, even though the idea has been shot down by the IMF and the United States when it was first brought up in the midst of the Asian financial crisis. Third, they are rethinking the issue of appropriate exchange rate arrangements, including the creation of a pan-Asian monetary union.
An i mportant lesson from the Asian financial crisis is that the bail-out packages provided through the IMF have been funneled out to crisis -hit countries too slowly and come with stringent conditions. Without quick and substantial international liquidity (consisting of both country's own foreign exchange reserves and foreign currency loans), a country's ability to deter and ward off speculative attacks on its currency is limited.
Large and rapid disbursement of international liquidity will enable a country to keep its interest rates below the critical level to prevent a currency crisis. The bilateral currency swap arrangements among Asian countries and the proposed AMF are two important sources of dependable liquidity that Asian countries might have to rely on during times of crises. By standing ready like a fire-brigade to quickly "douse" currency attacks, they can act as essential supplements to the IMF lending. In addition, the mere availability of credit facilities can act as a deterrence against would-be speculators. The real concern is that these credit facilities would give rise to the problem of "moral hazard" as countries might be tempted to engage in risky practices in the expectation of large bailouts.
Besides creating credit facilities, East Asian countries should consider a partial form of monetary integration in view of their diverse economic, social and political background. One solution to the problem of divergence is to have a few small monetary unions (or clusters) rather than a Pan-Asian monetary union. Brunei and Singapore have already formed a cluster which has been beneficial to both countries despite the fact that their supply shocks are not correlated. But the monetary union between these two countries is a special case where the dominant factor is probably the desire by Brunei to borrow the credibility of the MAS rather the fulfillment of the OCA criteria. Other East Asian countries wishing to form such a cluster should have symmetry of supply shocks as well as a high degree of social, economic and political compatibility among themselves. Initially, the focus should be on harmonization of economic policies within each cluster.
In the very long run, integration between small functioning monetary unions can be considered.
In the meantime, East Asian countries should consider establishing an AMF to support the sustainability of the various clusters. The moral hazard problem inherent in the AMF will be minimized because members of a monetary union can exert the necessary discipline on the macroeconomic policies of other members.
Hong Kong decided to peg its currency at 7.8 Hong Kong dollars to one US dollar under a currency board system in June 1983. At the same time, Macau chose to peg its currency at 103 patacas to 100 Hong Kong dollars.
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The European monetary union is like a marriage with a high degree of commitments such that members would endeavour to help one another out and make it work.
In contrast, a unilateral peg by one currency to another currency looks like a one-sided love affairs without any commitment from the other side.
The MUBS lies somewhere in the middle as in the case of an unmarried couple living together and assisting each other. not vary with its exchange rate. Second, as a highly open economy, its prices and money wages are likely to respond rapidly to its exchange rate changes, leaving its competitiveness unaffected.
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Data will be made available to readers upon request. We are indebted to the referee for suggesting that we examine the business cycles of these countries over time. 36 Government of Brunei Darussalam (1989) . 37 We have also worked on cluster analysis for identifying clusters of countries. For details, see Ngiam and Yuen (2000) . 38 The demand shocks are not presented or discussed as they are unlikely to be invariant to the demand management policies and currency regimes.
